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NEPHROLOGY FORUM
Withdrawal from dialysis: An ethical perspective
Principal discussant: DAVID C. LOWANCE
Atlanta, Georgia
Forum commentators: PETER A. SINGER and MARK SIEGLER
Center for clinical Medical Ethics, University of chicago, Chicago, Illinois
DR. JEROME P. KASSIRER (Associate Physician-in-Chief
New England Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts): We
depart today in more ways than one from our usual format.
Instead of presenting a patient whose findings illustrate some
pathophysiologic principles relevant to the practice of nephrol-
ogy, we present a patient whose behavior evoked an ethical
dilemma. Instead of inviting an academic nephrologist to be the
principal discussant, we have asked the patient's physician, an
experienced practicing nephrologist in Atlanta, to do so. To
enrich the discussion, we have enlisted two experts in medical
ethics. The discussion centers around the practical, legal, and
ethical problems raised by the patient who wishes to withdraw
from dialysis.
Case Presentation
DR. DAVID C. LOWANCE (Nephrologist, Atlanta, Georgia):
The patient is an unmarried 36-year-old male with congenital
vesicoureteral reflux, which led to total renal failure, thus
requiring the initiation of dialysis when he was 28 years old. In
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some respects he has been the ideal dialysis patient during the
6 years he has been dialysed in our unit: blood pressure, fluid
balance, dietary compliance, and phosphorus regulation have
been without problem. He has been a productive staff member
of a national organization. Psychosocial problems and behav-
ioral inconsistencies have been apparent, however. He has
never forgiven his deceased parents for letting him develop
end-stage renal disease (ESRD) by their not taking him to
doctors earlier. His attitude toward dialysis personnel has been
demanding. Periodically he has appeared late for dialysis,
asking to receive full treatment at the expense of personnel and
other patients, and on occasion he has been verbally abusive.
He has received psychiatric counseling intermittently. As I
said, however, he has been productive and is in very good
physical condition. Approximately one year ago, he had threat-
ened to cease dialysis hut was convinced to continue. He has
declined renal transplantation on the basis that it is not a
perfected science. In short, he is not an atypical dialysis
patient.
The current saga evolved over several days and, although the
story is divided into separate segments for presentation and
discussion, many of the encounters occurred simultaneously.
For approximately 10 days prior to the present confrontation,
the patient talked with dialysis personnel about discontinuing
dialysis. Because of access problems, one dialysis was missed,
and the patient was rescheduled for the following day. He did
not keep the appointment. He did not answer telephone calls to
his apartment and did not appear for work. His brother and
sister were contacted and it was determined that the patient
again was expressing a desire to discontinue dialysis. The
patient's siblings were asked to talk with him. Attempts by
dialysis and professional personnel to bring him to the dialysis
center were unsuccessful.
The patient's sister went to his apartment, determined he was
inside, and with the aid of the building manager, entered the
apartment against the patient's wishes. He refused to leave and
threatened legal action against his sister by himself or his estate
if she again entered his apartment against-his will. He expressed
a desire to stop dialysis and to die,
The patient did agree to talk to people by telephone. There
then began a 2-day barrage of telephone calls to the patient from
friends, dialysis personnel, and family members. Six days
following his last treatment, it was thought that more aggressive
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action was needed because the patient showed no inclination to
change his course of action. The family sought court orders to
declare the patient incompetent and to allow the family to enter
his apartment to meet with the patient. Several lawyers and
judges advised the family that neither of these avenues was
possible without legal risk to themselves. Telephone appeals to
the patient continued.
The patient remained adamant. Legal counsel again advised
against entering the patient's apartment. It was determined that
if a lawsuit declaring the patient mentally incompetent were
filed, he would be served notice to appear in court. If he did not
appear in court, he probably would be declared incompetent in
absentia by the judge, because only testimony relating to his
alleged incompetence would be presented. The family chose
this avenue and retained a lawyer.
The patient was notified by the court to appear, and he sought
legal counsel, who advised the patient to appear in court. By
this time, 7 days had elapsed since his last dialysis, and an
emergency hearing was scheduled.
I was present when the lawyer briefed the patient. The
lawyer, previously an accident victim himself, understood both
physical and emotional suffering. He repeatedly advised his
client not to stop dialysis but agreed to represent the patient if
he chose to do so. I served as a technical advisor to the patient's
lawyer. I was advised by his lawyer not to divulge specific
information about the patient's condition to his siblings' coun-
sel. I heeded that advice.
At the trial, the family's lawyer argued to have the patient
declared incompetent so dialysis could be ordered and psychi-
atric care sought. The patient's lawyer contended that the
patient was competent to make an appropriate decision and that
to declare him incompetent would violate his right to self-
determination.
When it appeared that the court might not declare the patient
incompetent, the family (a brother) testified that the suit had
been filed only to demonstrate to the patient how much he was
loved, and that the family would withdraw the suit to allow the
patient the freedom to make his own choice. The case was
closed.
At that time the family believed that the patient would agree
to one or two dialysis treatments to allow them time to talk with
him. After several minutes of conversation following the trial,
however, the patient restated his desire not to restart dialysis
and to go home to die.
I was asked to drive him home, and after the patient parted
tearfully from his family, he and I left. In the car, we talked
extensively about his decision and how it would encourage
other patients to make decisions for themselves. I expressed
regret about his choice but acknowledged his right to make the
decision.
Rather than drive the patient home, I drove him to a bus stop.
By doing so I hoped to demonstrate to the patient that our
system of care, although imperfect in his mind, would continue
to provide for others and would be there for him if he chose to
reenter the system. I informed the patient that we would be
happy to reinstitute dialysis should he change his mind.
Discussion
The foregoing presentation and following discussion encom-
pass two problems encountered frequently by the practicing
nephrologist. The first problem, that of dealing with a patient
who wishes to cease dialysis, was highlighted recently by
Kjellstrand liii. Clearly, many patients choose not to live on
dialysis, and we accept this decision when it appears appropri-
ate to us. The second problem, discussed frequently as the
"right of patient refusal," is more complex and contains few
definitive solutions. In a more general sense, however, this
aspect of the problems raised by our patient may be viewed
simply as the right of a patient to choose a course of action
different from that recommended or deemed appropriate by the
physician. It is not in the scope of this discussion to review all
the problems one encounters in dealing with such a patient.
Rather, my purpose is to explore, against the background of this
particular instance, how a practicing physician must influence
and guide patients and families through a maze of unfamiliar
technologies, uncertain outcomes, and periods of emotional
turbulence. Indeed, we often are asked to deal with issues for
which there are no simple answers and with issues for which the
right complex answers vary among individuals. Few of us are
blessed with enough time to examine prospectively the details
of the motives on which each decision is made or advice given
and their likely consequences. It is usually in retrospect, often
while we lay awake at night, that we begin to ask ourselves why
we behaved in a certain way and whether our responses were
appropriate. A forum such as today's affords us the opportunity
to reflect on some of the principles that direct our actions and
which therefore help us identify a basic structure about which
"appropriate behavior" or "ethical decision-making" take
place daily.
Decision analysis is a useful clinical tool and has been
popularized by many [21. Its success is predicated on our ability
to utilize experiences and facts, assign numerical values to
them, and use the information in a predictive fashion to make
clinical medicine cost-effective and efficient [2]. Many persons
might arrive at the same conclusion by different routes, but if
properly utilized, branched-chain decision-making might be
considered the "straightest line" between a hypothetical point
A and point B. An advantage the "craft" or "science" of
medicine enjoys is that point B frequently is an agreed-upon
goal; for example, a serum sodium of 140 mEq/liter is more
desirable than a serum sodium of 120 mEq/liter. Quantitative
decision-making and other decision aids, whether in a com-
puter, ajournal, or in the physician's mind, can help determine
how the sodium concentration varied from normal and how best
to return it to normal. I would like to reiterate that the one fact
allowing the science of medicine to utilize this simple straight-
forward method of problem-solving is that the goal, "point B,"
is a commonly agreed-upon beneficial target point. The science
of medicine also lends itself to this approach because the utility
assigned to each segment in the decision process can usually be
agreed upon or mathematically derived.
Contrary to the advantage that the 'science" of medicine
enjoys is the disadvantage with which the "art" of medicine
struggles. This disadvantage is epitomized by the case we are
discussing today: the patient and the physician perceived point
B entirely differently. The patient perceived point B as with-
drawal from dialysis, whereas the physician perceived point B
as continuation of dialysis while helping the patient cope with
the emotional and physical stresses associated with dialysis.
Furthermore, it would be virtually impossible to assign agreed-
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upon numerical values to the segments in either the patient's or
physician's minds that led to disparate perceptions of point B.
This inability highlights the difference between a science that
lends itself to quantification versus an art that deals with
less-tangible feelings and emotions. These disparate percep-
tions have clearly defined outcomes; one is final.
In such settings, who is empowered to make the final deci-
sions? What should the physician's role be? Again, we have no
simple answers to these questions. Each of us must have a
framework within which to work. The structure in Figure 1 is
the one in which I perceive myself as operating daily.
Ethics can be defined as the "discipline of dealing with what
is good and bad or right and wrong or dealing with moral duty
and obligation" [31. In practice, we all consider ethics as a code
of behavior that underlies the manner in which we deal with one
another. All of society is influenced by ethical principles that
have evolved through time and that are considered appropriate.
These ethical principles have produced the laws by which we
govern ourselves. My own belief is that ethics is a relative
science operating between two extremes, right and wrong.
Consequently, one can easily understand how the moral codes
of behavior vacillate between these two opposite poles. Our
ethical stance influences the laws society makes, so it is not
surprising that laws change as we alter our perception of good
and bad. The questions regarding our right to live, right to die,
legalized abortion, passive euthanasia, and active euthanasia all
reflect changing behavior and are relatively "modern" inquir-
ies.
All the participants in the schema proposed in Figure 1 have
their own interpretations of the current ethical environment,
and each participant has different exposures to the same envi-
ronment, according to differences in experience, education,
community, and family history. Society will write laws and
establish behavior codes deemed appropriate for governing
itself. These laws will be influenced by our collective perception
of good and bad.
As I stated earlier, my perception of what was best for my
patient was the opposite of what he perceived as best. Again,
we can ask, who is empowered to make the decision, and what
is our obligation to the patient and to ourselves when a situation
such as this arises? Obviously, different individuals will give
different answers to this question, so what I say must be
construed as personal opinion. On the other hand, I hope that
our common social and medical milieu has influenced me
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Fig. 1. Factors influencing doctor-patient decision-making.
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sufficiently to allow my personal opinion to lie somewhere
"inside the 95% confidence bands" for opinions generated by
members of our profession.
Why was the patient's perception of point B different from
ours? Why couldn't we convince him of what we believed to be
right? What is our obligation to such a patient? How can similar
situations be avoided in the future? None of these questions has
simple answers. I have no idea why we could not persuade him
to our way of thinking. We certainly tried, his family tried, and
his 'society" tried. Despite our efforts, his interpretation of
many of the environmental influences in Figure I led him to a
different conclusion from ours as to what was best for him. We
failed to recognize this fact early enough to prevent a crisis.
Earlier recognition of this difference and earlier discussion with
the patient regarding our differences might have averted the
crisis.
How can we avoid this type of crisis in the future? I believe
the answer rests in better education of ourselves and our
patients. We must continually seek to identify and understand
patients' needs and to offer patients alternatives insofar as
medically possible. We should acknowledge that sometimes we
will fail in bridging the gap in opinion between ourselves and
our patients. But this failure should never be allowed to
interfere with our continued pursuit of a mutually acceptable
and appropriate solution to the patient's problem.
While pursuing these goals, we must remember one impor-
tant fact. In the final analysis, medical decisions are too
important to be made solely by doctors. The decisions are too
personal, too complex, and not merely scientific decisions.
Because of this, these decisions must be made with the patient
and not for the patient. Our role remains both educator and
student: we must give the patient technical advice and we must
provide guidance based on our own experience, education, and
community and family influences. While doing so, we must
always remember that our patients react to our advice within
their own personal sphere of influences. We must be willing to
listen to their interpretations of what we say and modify our
approach depending on their needs. If we perceive that our
patients do not agree with our opinions, it is not our job to
become angry and forceful or to withdraw from caring for them.
Rather, we should support the patients' decisions; it might be
the only "right" decision for the individual patient. If after
educating our patients about all possible options, we find that
they still reach different conclusions than we would for our-
selves, our job remains that of an advisor and friend.
The patient discussed today presents the practicing nephrolo-
gist with the challenge quite analogous with that confronting the
academic nephrologist in the conduct of a research project. One
should not embark on a research project unless one is commit-
ted to discovering the truth. In the laboratory, this endeavor
entails creating an environment in which the laws of nature
dictate the outcome of an experiment. In the practice of clinical
medicine, this endeavor entails educating both ourselves and
our patients to a level of mutual understanding that allows the
patients to make decisions correct for their needs. As physi-
cians, we can work only to create the appropriate environment
in both instances. We have no right to manipulate the environ-
ment to force results we prefer. Our preference for what is right
just might be wrong.
I have left one word out of today's discussion intentionally.
The word is compassion, defined as sharing or having a deep
feeling of someone else's suffering. None of us can adequately
feel someone's else's suffering. This basic problem creates
many of the ethical dilemmas we face in medicine today. Yet we
have a continuing obligation to try to understand the patient's
difficulties. At best, our efforts will be incomplete. Nonetheless
we must continually try to understand and support our patients
in their struggles to decide what is best for themselves.
Forum commentary
DR. PETER A. SINGER (Fe/low, The Center for Clinical
Medical Ethics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois) and
DR. MARK SIEGLER (Director, The Center for Clinical Medical
Ethics, University of Chicago): Should the physician accede to
the request of an apparently competent 36-year-old man with
end-stage renal failure to discontinue dialysis? What do we
know empirically about treatment refusal and stopping dialysis?
How have the courts dealt with treatment-refusal cases? How
should the physician ethically respond to instances of treatment
refusal? We shall examine refusal of treatment, in the context of
this case, from three separate frameworks: epidemiology, the
law, and ethics. These approaches inform in different ways.
Epidemiology captures the existing patterns of patient-doctor
interactions. The law ratifies social norms of ethical behavior.
Ethics delineates what ought to be done for the finest discharge
of human behavior.
The epidemiologic framework
The refusal of treatment is a frequent and serious problem in
the clinical setting. In a recent study of the epidemiology of
treatment refusal in medical hospitals, Applebaum and Roth
reported that the incidence of refusal was 4.6 per 100 patient
days [41. Of 242 patients cared for on a medical ward during an
8-week observation period, 45 (19%) refused at least one
treatment or diagnostic procedure. Fifteen percent of refusals
were potentially life-threatening. Reasons for refusal were
usually multifactorial, but the most common primary causes
were: organic brain syndromes, character type, and failure to
inform the patient about the purpose of the treatment or
procedure. The most common physician responses to refusal
were: reinforming patients (28%), forcing treatment in incom-
petent patients (14%), permitting proper refusals (12%), and
forceful persuasion or coaxing (10%). The most common out-
comes of refusal were: no treatment given (34%), delayed
acceptance (31%), and forced treatment (17%). Physicians'
responses tended not to relate to the specific reasons for the
patients' refusal: "Physicians often seemed too ready to con-
cede patients' 'right to refuse' rather than to recognize the
clinical problems that lay at the bottom of the refusal (e.g., poor
or inconsistent communication) and to take steps to remedy
them."
Neu and Kjellstrand reported that stopping long-term dialysis
is not uncommon: 9% of 1766 dialysis patients died because
dialysis was stopped [1]. Stopping dialysis accounted for 22% of
all deaths and, after vascular causes, was the second most
common reason for death [5]. Stopping dialysis was more
common in older patients and in patients whose rate and
severity of complications were increased, Approximately one-
half of the patients who stopped dialysis were competent; most
of them made their own decision to stop. About one-half were
128 Nephrology Forum: Withdrawal from dialysis
incompetent; the decision to stop was initiated by the physician
or the family. The mean duration of treatment before discon-
tinuation was 30 months, but 10% discontinued after 3 years,
and 3% discontinued after 9 years of dialysis. Some authors
have corroborated [6, 7], whereas others have disputed [8],
these results.
The legal framework
Since the seminal Quinlan case in 1976, the courts have heard
many cases involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment. Because of the number of cases, we will limit our
presentation to those involving competent patients like the one
under discussion, although we recognize that many principles
developed in cases involving incompetent patients can be
applied to competent patients. We will attempt to highlight
cases dealing with the discontinuation of dialysis.
The law distinguishes between patients who are terminally ill
and those who are not. In the case of terminally ill patients, the
law upholds the right of competent patients to forego life-
sustaining therapies. For example, Satz v. Perlmutter, a 1980
decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, upheld the right of a
competent 73-year-old man with advanced amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis and ventilatory failure to discontinue mechanical
ventilation [9]. This decision was reaffirmed in the 1987 Farrell
case, in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the
right of a 37-year-old, competent, terminally ill woman with the
same disease to discontinue mechanical ventilation [10], The
1982 Cinque case, heard by the Supreme Court of New York,
involved a patient's request to stop dialysis [11]; he was a
competent 41-year-old man with long-standing, insulin-depen-
dent diabetes mellitus complicated by blindness and bilateral
amputation of the lower extremities due to neuropathy and
peripheral vascular disease. The court found that he was
terminally ill (his estimated life expectancy on dialysis was 6
months according to the treating nephrologist) and, citing the
"constant and severe pain caused by his multiple debilitating
irreversible and terminal conditions," upheld Cinque's right to
stop dialysis.
Statutory law, in the form of natural-death legislation, also
recognizes the right of terminally ill patients to forego life-
sustaining therapy. For example, the California Natural Death
Act declares that "adult persons have the fundamental right to
control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own
medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining
procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal
condition [12]." The definition of "terminal condition" is "an
incurable condition. .
.which, regardless of the application of
life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical
judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-
sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of
death of the patient."
The courts also have permitted the discontinuation of life-
sustaining therapy in competent patients who are not terminally
ill (and who may even have a prolonged life expectancy with
treatment). In the 1984 Bartling case, the California Appellate
Court upheld the right of a competent 70-year-old man with lung
cancer and emphysema (and an estimated life expectancy of
one year) to discontinue mechanical ventilation [13]. In the 1986
Bouvia case, the same court upheld the right of a competent,
28-year-old, quadriplegic woman with cerebral palsy (and an
estimated life expectancy of 15 to 20 years) to refuse nasogas-
tric feeding [14]. The courts have upheld the right of Jehovah's
Witnesses to refuse blood transfusion and the right of compe-
tent patients to refuse limb amputation.
In 1979, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts con-
sidered the request of Kenneth Meyers to stop dialysis [15].
Meyers was a competent 24-year-old prisoner with end-stage
renal failure due to glomerulonephritis. He refused dialysis as
"a form of protest against his placement in a medium, as
opposed to minimum, security prison." He would be able to
live "an otherwise normal and healthy life" if he continued
dialysis. Although the court compelled treatment because "the
State's interest in upholding orderly prison administration tips
the balance in favor of authorizing treatment wihout consent,"
it found that "given the magnitude of the medical invasion
occasioned by dialysis. . .the defendant's interest in refusing
dialysis is strong enough, despite the positive prognosis, to
counterbalance the State's usually predominant interest in the
preservation of life."
The legal reasoning of these treatment-refusal cases involves
a balancing act between individual and state interests. The
individual interests are (I) the common-law right of informed
consent ("the right not to be treated without consent is the
same as the right not to be treated at all" [161) and (2) the
constitutional right to privacy ("the privacy of one's person and
body ought to be protected by the Constitution against un-
wanted intrusions by the state" [17]). The contervailing state
interests are: (I) the preservation of life; (2) the prevention of
suicide; (3) the safeguarding of the ethical integrity of the
medical profession; and (4) the protection of innocent third
parties [18]. The judicial cases listed here illustrate that the
interests of the individual generally outweigh the interests of the
state.
The ethical framework
Should the physician accept outright and without discussion
a patient's treatment refusal? How should the physician assess
the quality of a treatment refusal? If, after discussion, the
patient and physician continue to disagree, how should the
physician respond? We will argue that physicians and patients
should always discuss the refusal of important treatment
choices to ensure both that the patient has adequate decision-
making capacity and that the communication between patient
and physician fosters that capacity. We will identify the con-
siderations germane to the evaluation of treatment refusals.
Finally, we will examine the physician's appropriate responses
when patient and physician continue to disagree after adequate
discussion has occurred.
Discussion between patient and physician serves as the
procedural underpinning of "shared decision-making" (the
ethical equivalent of the legal doctrine of informed consent), the
components of which are disclosure, voluntariness, and deci-
sion-making capacity. Patients, like the man under discussion,
must have decision-making capacity if their treatment refusals
are to be considered valid. Decision-making capacity is the
ethical equivalent of the legal notion of competence; in law,
there is a presumption of competence, which can only be
reversed by a court. The President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (hereafter referred to as the President's Commission)
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recommended that assessments of decision-making capacity be
based on "the person's actual functioning in situations in which
a decision about health care is to be made" [19]. The Commis-
sion identified the elements of decision-making capacity as (I)
possession of a set of values and goals; (2) the ability to
communicate and understand information; and (3) the ability to
reason and to deliberate about one's choices [20]. It is evident
that discussion between patient and physician is required to
ensure that patients who refuse treatment have adequate deci-
sion-making capacity.
Decision-making capacity not only must be possessed by the
patient, it also must be supported by patient-physician commu-
nication. Jay Katz, in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient,
puts it this way:
Ignorance, misconceptions, exaggerated fears, and
magical hopes about matters such as diagnostic tests
and therapeutic interventions, as well as about what
patients and physicians want and are able to do for one
another, can decisively influence choice. The danger is
great that patients' and doctors' choices will be dis-
torted by such internally and externally engendered
mistaken ideas. Thus, conversation will have to be
more extensive and more searching if one believes that
such distortions affect choice and that they can and
must be sorted out [211.
The physician must ensure that the patient has decision-making
capacity and that the patient-physician communication fosters
this capacity. Therefore, one should never accept a patient's
refusal of treatment without discussion.
How should the physician assess the quality of a treatment
refusal? There are no established clinical rules here; the physi-
cian must rely on a type of clinical judgment known as "moral
discernment" [221. Patients must be able to understand the
nature of their medical problem and be able to express the
medical treatment alternatives (including no treatment) along
with their consequences (the "communicate and understand
information" requirement of the President's Commission).
They must retain intellect and rationality sufficient to choose
among the alternatives (the "reason and deliberate" require-
ment of the President's Commission), and the choice should not
be merely a reaction to the pain, fear, and uncertainty of
disease. The choice must be authentic (the "possession of a set
of values and beliefs" requirement of the President's Commis-
sion). It must be "consistent with the 'kind of person' this
patient is. . .with [hisi enduring values. .
.previous choic-
es. . . [and] the convictions he has previously asserted and
defended" [221. There are several ways that authenticity can be
validated, including living wills and durable powers of attorney
for health care, but perhaps the best way is a long-standing
doctor-patient relationship within the context of which issues of
life-sustaining therapy have been discussed.
The difficulty of formulating general rules that apply to
particular cases might explain why no consensus exists regard-
ing the standard that patients must meet for their decision-
making capacity to be considered adequate. We make determi-
nations of decision-making capacity in clinical practice to avoid
two types of error: treating incompetent individuals as compe-
tent (an approach that exposes them to the potential bad
outcomes of an unwise choice), and treating competent individ-
uals as incompetent (a posture that limits their exercise of
self-determination). The ethical principles of beneficence,
which directs that physicians seek to promote their patients'
best interests (that is, health), and autonomy, which directs that
individuals have the right to form, revise, and pursue personal
plans for life, often conflict. The balancing of these ethical
principles must incorporate the specific risk-benefit ratios of
individual cases.
Certain factors should predispose physicians to accede to
patients' treatment refusal: (1) if the disease is chronic (because
the patient is familiar with the quality of life associated with at
least one of the treatment options, and the authenticity of the
choice is easier to validate); (2) if the disease is terminal
(because the treatment refusal affects the timing rather than the
fact of death); or (3) if the treatment will result in permanent
disability (because patients must decide what quality of life they
would be willing to accept). Other factors should predispose
physicians to resist the treatment refusal: (1) if the disease is
acute or the patient rejects discussion about the treatment
refusal (because the decision-making capacity of the patient and
the authenticity of the refusal are difficult to judge); (2) if the
extent of bodily invasion occasioned is small; or (3) if treatment
offers prolonged survival and the consequences of non-treat-
ment are fatal (because the condition is reversible).
Advocates of maximal autonomy will be disenchanted with
this model of the physician as judge. However, when practiced
in good faith by the discerning physician, this role represents
the best compromise between medical beneficence and the
protection of individual rights. The more difficult task is not the
grounding of individual rights, but their protection from abridg-
ment in actual practice. Our assumption is that an explicit
consideration of criteria for acceding to or resisting treatment
refusal will result in the abridgment of fewer rights than in the
current standard of practice, wherein ethical decisions are made
implicitly and on unclear grounds. Another response to the
criticism of physician as judge is captured below:
It is true that the determination both of rationality and
of authenticity is made by the physician. Many critics
of medicine would prefer that the patient's condition—
i.e., his rationality or competence or authenticity—
rather than the physician's judgment of his condition,
actually control whether a physician overrides a
patient's wishes. This notion is unworkable. Rational-
ity, competence and authenticity are not absolute
standards such as 'Middle C.' Rather, they are states
of mental responses that must be construed. While one
would hope for a rule of action that would eliminate
subjectivity and avoid wrong decisions, we have seen
why conceptually neat alternatives—either libertarian-
ism or an all encompassing medical paternalism—are
even more unacceptable [22].
Patients and physicians, after discussion, agree about the
treatment choice in most instances. But no doubt in a minority
of cases, fundamental and intractable disagreements will persist
even after discussion. How is the physician to respond to these
instances of "ethical impasse?" The spectrum of potential
responses includes abandonment of the patient, gentle verbal
persuasion, and frank coercion. Some would argue that the
physician should refrain from responding at all out of respect
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for patient autonomy. But the mere invocation of the principle
of autonomy is insufficient; patients as well as physicians
possess autonomy in the patient-doctor relationship; and auton-
omy is the constraint upon, not the goal of, the relationship:
[T]he invocation of the concept of autonomy fails to
provide sufficient practical guidance to morally con-
scientious physicians and patients to enable them to
determine where on a spectrum of paternalism! con-
sumerism or dependence!independence their profes-
sional relationship will and ought to stabilize [23].
The central moral and practical dilemma facing con-
cerned patients and conscientious physicians. . . is to
balance the rights of patients and the responsibilities of
physicians—and the rights of physicians and the re-
sponsibilities of patients. . . . [23].
Autonomy constrains and limits the negotiations and
the activities of both [the physician and the patient]:
neither party may violate the autonomy of the other or
use the other merely as a means to an end. But
respecting autonomy as a constraint or a limit does not
imply seeking it as a goal or praising it as an ideal [24].
This model of bilateral autonomy as constraint on behavior can
ground the physician's response to treatment refusal. This
approach would prohibit the physician from abandoning the
patient or from compelling or coercing the patient into accept-
ing or continuing treatment. It would not prevent the physician
from withdrawing from the patient's care after suitable alterna-
tive arrangements had been made or from attempting to gently
persuade the patient to accept or continue treatment. Admit-
tedly, the distinction between persuasion and coercion is not
always clear in practice and requires more discussion and
research. In the words of Dr. Kassirer, such a model would
prevent physicians from "adding insult to injury" by "usurping
patients' prerogatives" [25].
Conclusion
The decision made by the patient under discussion to stop
dialysis is not unusual. Like him, 50% of the patients who
discontinue dialysis are competent, and most make the decision
themselves. He is younger, has been on dialysis longer, and has
fewer complications than does the average patient who stops
dialysis. We are unsure of his reasons for wishing to discontinue
dialysis, just as we are unclear of the rationale in many patients
who refuse medical treatment. The patient is a competent,
non-terminally ill adult without dependents. Based on the cases
of Peter Cinque and Kenneth Meyers, and the parallels in the
Bouvia, Jehovah's Witness, and amputation cases, we conclude
that the courts would likely uphold his right to discontinue
dialysis.
The physician and dialysis team did not accept outright and
without discussion the patient's refusal of dialysis, but made
multiple attempts to contact him by telephone. We are not given
specific details of discussions between physician and patient;
perhaps such discussions did not occur because of the patient's
general reluctance to talk to anyone. The factors that weaken
the treatment refusal (the patient's rejection of discussion, and
prolonged survival with treatment versus certain death without
treatment) seemed to outweigh the factors that strengthen it
(chronic condition) in the mind of the treating physician in this
case. But despite his conceptual rejection of the treatment
refusal, the physician chose neither to abandon the patient nor
to coerce him to continue dialysis—the doctor left an open door
and a cordial invitation to the patient to re-initiate treatment.
Refusal of treatment in general, and of dialysis in particular,
is not uncommon; physicians' responses to treatment refusal
are often nonspecific, without regard to the reasons why a
patient refuses treatment. The bulk of judicial opinion upholds
the right of competent patients, even if non-terminally ill, to
forego life-sustaining therapies, including dialysis; this can be
viewed as the courts' ratification of social norms of ethical
behavior. Physicians should always discuss treatment refusals
with their patients; they should develop and use in good faith
explicit criteria for assessing the quality of treatment refusals.
In instances of intractable disagreement or "ethical impasse,"
they should encourage, but never coerce, their patients to
accept treatment.
DR. LOWANCE: Here is the epilogue to our case presentation.
The following morning, the patient called the unit and requested
dialysis. His blood urea nitrogen was greater than 180 mg!dl,
creatinine greater than 20 mg!dl, and potassium greater than 7.0
mEq!liter. Successful dialysis was accomplished. Currently he
is in psychiatric counseling and has returned to work. He
remains a productive member of society. The decision to return
to dialysis was his, a decision we gladly supported.
Questions and answers
DR. JEROME P. KASSIRER: My first question relates to the
stability of patients' preferences over time. It occurs to me that
the problem in dealing with some of these ethical dilemmas and
that of carrying out formal decision analysis in individual
patients is similar. In some decision analyses, the patient's
preference is a predominant factor in the outcome of the
analysis [25]. When incorporating patients' preferences into any
utility function in decision analysis, it is essential that any utility
adjustment for the quality of the patient's life must be as
accurate a reflection of the patient's feelings as possible. The
problem with these quality adjustments is that they may not be
stable: patients have one view of how they feel about a given
state on one occasion and another view on a later occasion.
Indeed, such was the case in the patient we are discussing
today. How can we deal with the shifting sands of such personal
assessments?
DR. LOWANCE: Patients' attitudes do frequently change. This
is one of the reasons that assigning utility to these values will
frequently be less precise in the "art" than in the "science" of
medicine. Indeed, this patient had decided to stop dialysis once
before, had changed his mind, and now was reverting to his
previous position. Because he was so knowledgeable about the
technical and scientific aspects of his disease, my scientific
expertise was of little value. An attempt to educate myself to his
personal needs, and to then educate him to the fact they could
be met, became my major endeavor. Again, as demonstrated in
Figure 1, a continued, open dialogue between the physician and
patient is essential for appropriate patient management. It is
possibly the only way this "soft" value of attitude can be
handled. In some interchanges the difference between the two
participants is small, so the bidirectional education is quick and
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easy. In other instances, as in this case, the differences are large
and the process is complex and demanding.
DR. KASSIRER: Here is another knotty problem. Some pa-
tients have been known to refuse certain essential treatments,
such as blood transfusions, have been forced by the courts to
accept the treatment, and later have expressed gratitude that
they were forced to take the life-saving treatment. When such
legal coercion occurs, what is the aftermath?
DR. SIEGLER: This is a difficult question to answer because
two important studies have not been done: (I) the assessment of
whether people whose wishes are overridden retrospectively
approve of their care, and (2) whether a person's stated wish at
time zero persists at 6 or 12 months with regard to the same type
of decision. In essence, do people mean what they say? In an
attempt to answer these questions, our group currently is
conducting a study in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclero-
sis (ALS) to determine whether patients' wishes remain con-
stant over time or whether they change.
DR. JOHN T. HARRINGTON (Chief of Medicine, Newton-
Wellesley Hospital, Newton, Massachusetts): Dr. Siegler, you
indicated that we need to know whether patients always mean
what they say, Dr. Lowance's experience shows that at least
some patients don't. My experience with another difficult
patient also supports the contention that they do not always
mean what they say. This man has been taken care of byrne and
other members of this audience for many years. Eight years
ago, he expressed a desire to stop dialysis and, in fact, his case
went to court. The court refused his petition because he was at
that time a prisoner. Yet today he is alive and doing well with a
serum creatinine of 1.8 mg/dl, having undergone successful
cadaveric kidney transplantation. That patient clearly did not
mean what he said in his lawsuit, that is, that he wanted to stop
dialysis and die. I suspect that he simply was trying to get better
prison facilities during the time he was being dialyzed.
My specific, and unrelated, question is, how does one know
whether a patient is severely depressed, as are many suicidal
patients? If today's patient was, shouldn't we have treated his
depression as well as his renal failure?
DR. LOWANCE: I think everybody is hitting on salient points
about the motives behind this patient's behavior. I actually did
allow him to ride a bus home and I did that intentionally
because to the end, my perceived job and my goal was to do
what I thought best for him. Rightly or wrongly, I believed my
"point B" was better for him than his "point B." In dealing
with this patient over a number of years, I have learned he
needed reinforcement in believing that our system of care was
solid. He periodically needed constraints placed on his ability to
manipulate the system. He periodically needed to be told that
beyond a certain point, manipulation became destructive to
everybody working in the system. One of the points I tried to
make to him was that I had other patients to see and other
responsibilities to discharge and that we had done all we could
for him. It was now time for him to decide whether or not he
could conform to the rules of our system. We had done all we
could do. At that time, it was becoming detrimental to our
system to allow him to consume as much time and effort as he
did. I do not think that he ever wanted to die. I think that, in
fact, one of the things he wanted to do was to see exactly how
much people cared about him. His parents had died at an early
again to assess exactly how far people were willing to go to
express love and appreciation for him. He is periodically
depressed and is treated for that depression. It is a depression
that on occasions creates erratic behavior. The courts, how-
ever, would not order psychiatric care, because they perceived
him as competent to make decisions for himself.
DR. MICHAEL GR0IDIN (Director, Program in Medical Ethics,
Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health,
Boston): I am quite concerned about the nature, scope, and
justification of the argument presented with regard to treatment
refusal. I will take as a given that an adult, competent, in-
formed, and understanding patient has the absolute right to
refuse any and all medical therapies. My concern relates to your
criteria and methods for assessing competence. I think the
appropriate sphere for the discussion of competence lies within
the nuances of the physician-patient clinical encounter. The
questions are when and how we assess whether people mean
what they say and say what they mean. Specifically, when do
we recognize a red flag that suggests the need for further
exploration and elucidation of a patient's understanding and
intent? The patient who refuses to even enter into a dialogue
poses a particular dilemma, but I am concerned also with the
patient who does respond to probing. What are the limits or
boundaries of such discourse? When do you believe the pa-
tient? What questions do you ask and what answers are you
looking for? I am concerned, Dr. Lowance, that you focused on
the specific explanations or reasons given by the patient and
disregarded the fact that the patient had explored and re-
sponded to the question. In other words, I fear that in this
interchange, the physician worried more about receiving the
answer he was looking for than on being satisfied with the
encounter itself. When a patient gives the "right" answer, the
physician might respond, "That's fine; you need not respond
further. We will honor your wishes." If the patient does not
give the "right" answer, however, the physician might re-
spond, "I did not find your answer acceptable. Let's probe
further and push the encounter along until I'm satisfied." Of
course, competence is an independent assessment and does not
depend on a patient's specific response. Unfortunately, one
questions competence when a patient refuses therapy but rarely
when a patient accepts a physician's course of action. I might
equally suspect as incompetent anyone who accepts a life with
dialysis. Patients are either competent or incompetent, but not
incompetent just because they refuse therapy. I grant that a
clinical encounter is necessary for assessment of the patient's
ability to competently understand the risks, benefits, alterna-
tives, and consequences of a specific decision, but my question
relates to the end-point of the encounter. Even if the physician
disagrees with the patient's decision, and even if it might appear
at initial assessment that the decision is a "bad" one, at some
point the clinician must accept the patient's response and
discontinue debate. Dr. Lowance and Dr. Siegler, would you
comment please?
DR. LOWANCE: As I discussed, I believe our obligation is to
educate the patient to a level of understanding that allows him
to make a reasoned personal decision. I think this notion is
different from pushing a patient to do what we want him to do.
Admittedly, some of us may be better or more forceful educa-
age, he had been reared by his siblings, and he wanted once tors than others. On the other hand, if we do our job properly
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the process will be one of education through dialogue and not
one of coercion.
DR. SIEGLER: I did not mean to suggest that the patient's
goals have to coincide with mine. A patient could have several
possible goals: the right to die, the right to refuse treatment, the
right to make a political statement about rights, secondary
gains—there are a whole variety of potential goals. It would
help a lot, I think, for the physician at least to be made aware of
which goal or goals the patient is pursuing. It makes it easier to
acknowledge and respect a wish if patients are willing to clarify
their goals. Surely this does not mean that a patient who is
totally unwilling to make such a clarification is by definition
incompetent and ought to be treated despite his or her refusal.
You are obviously right that non-hospitalized patients fre-
quently vote with their feet in a variety of ways, for example, by
not seeking our attention, by not coming back to see us, or by
disappearing from the health care system.
I am in total sympathy with the notion that patient goals and
prerogatives ultimately reign supreme. Within the clinical en-
counter, within an ongoing, established doctor-patient relation-
ship in which a patient is making demands without explaining
the goals that he or she is pursuing, and without giving reasons
for the demands, I think it is appropriate in that context to push
the patient harder—not to get agreement with your goal, but to
get a clarification and understanding of the patient's goal.
There are ethicists in this country who would place the
presumption in such an encounter at a very different level from
the level at which I have just placed it. For me, the presumption
in a relationship between a physician and a patient is that the
mutual interaction should be uncoerced and voluntary but, as
Dr. Lowance suggested, based on mutual understanding. Dis-
cussion of goals is a very important ingredient in that under-
standing. Now there are ethicists, supporters of the autonomy
school in particular, who would say that any effort on the part
of a physician or others in the health care system to ask a
person to explain anything is absolutely outrageous. I know you
did not say that. Presumably, all you want is for people to make
decisions for themselves. But you are concerned that anything
a physician says may be coercive and that therefore the
physician ought not to say anything except offer neutral,
value-free options. Are you attacking me for the line I have
tried to establish?
DR. GR0DIN: I am concerned about whether the answer that
the patient gives determines how you proceed. It seems to me
that the specifics of the patient's response did make a difference
to you, Dr. Siegler. I am not sure whether that is appropriate.
Such a demand extends beyond the need for probing within the
encounter to assure that the patient has at least thought about
and rationally analyzed the situation. To push this point further,
Dr. Singer and you even had suggested the notion of authen-
ticity or consistency as criteria for assessing competence. I find
such a test disturbing. Clearly, if someone who has been well
maintained on dialysis for a number of years suddenly pro-
claims, "I want to stop," the physician might think, "This
sudden change of heart seems out of character" and might then
initiate a discussion with the patient about what appears to be a
decision based on confusion. On the other hand, after exploring
the decision with the patient, the physician might discover that
the patient has had a sudden rational and reasoned, albeit
radical, change in treatment goal or life expectancy. At least in
the case of the patient presented today, I am reassured that the
patient's physician has cared for this patient over an extended
period, and such continuity can lend insight into the clinical
encounter. The question is whether patients who are less well
known to their doctors are given more or less credibility with
regard to the authenticity of their decisions. I want to know
whether it is the answer itself that determines how far you
probe the patient, or what point in the clinical encounter will be
sufficient for you to say, "This patient's decision is authentic
and consistent, and therefore I will accept the decision to refuse
therapy."
DR. SIEGLER: Authenticity is not the sole ethical basis for
accepting or rejecting a patient's wishes. What Dr. Singer and I
have tried to suggest is that the clinical factors in a case, the
nature of the person, the quality of the reasons, and the quality
of the justification are all legitimate factors to take into account.
For example, if a patient who has behaved in a certain way over
time suddenly behaves in a totally different way, the physician
is presented with a clinical clue. Is it right for the physician to
pursue that clinical clue to figure out why a patient, whom the
physician thought he or she understood, is suddenly making
decisions and behaving in different ways, or is it the physician's
role to say, "Oh yes, I understand that you behaved one way
during the past 9 years that we have worked together, and you
are now behaving differently and that is your prerogative." I
say the change in behavior is an important clinical clue to
pursue. If one finds that the patient's change in behavior is the
result of encephalopathy, a psychiatric change, or an emotional
crisis that might otherwise have gone unrecognized, then those
are important clinical data. The clinical examination of the
patient's authenticity is a legitimate part of the clinical process.
I'm not saying that people cannot change their minds. People do
change their minds for a lot of reasons, They do it over time;
surely the concept of authenticity would not prevent people
from changing their minds.
DR. GR0DIN: How we feel about the decision a patient makes
is an important area of exploration, but such feelings must be
carefully separated from respect for the absolute right of the
patient to be the final appropriate authority for decision-mak-
ing. It is quite clear, however, that you feel much better now
that the patient has agreed to continue his therapy. It is
interesting what role emotions play in the moral life and how
significant it is to "feel right" about "doing right."
DR. RONALD PERRONE (Division of Nephrology, New En-
gland Medical Center): I wanted to respond to the point Dr.
Grodin made. You objected to pushing patients too hard and
said that we push until we hear the answer we want to hear. As
a physician I would feel terrible having let a patient make an
irreversible and fatal decision based on a temporary or transient
problem and inspired by a poorly thought-out series of actions.
For example, the patient that Dr. Lowance described sounded
like an angry fellow: he was angry at his parents for not having
had his disease diagnosed early enough; he probably was angry
at his brother and sister because they were rich and he was not.
It appeared that he was angry at the dialysis staff because they
did not accommodate his demands. I wouldn't have any prob-
lem "pushing" such a patient; I would not bring him into the
dialysis unit and strap him down, but I would push him as hard
as I could and not feel bad about that. I think a relevant example
is attempted suicide. In my experience, people don't wake up
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and say, "You s.o.b., you kept me alive." Generally they are
grateful. That doesn't mean that they live the rest of their lives
feeling that way. But I think that as a physician, you really need
to "push hard" when it is reasonable to do so. I would not push
a diabetic with amputations, neuropathy, and blindness, who
had decided to discontinue dialysis, to continue therapy. That's
different. In a patient who is otherwise healthy, I would have no
hesitation in pushing as hard or even harder than Dr. Lowance
did.
DR. GR0DIN: In my view your example is a clear case of
unwarranted patient coercion. Although you believe that your
paternalistic stance warrants your decision-making for the
patient who thanks you after the fact, this is a dangerous
justification for such coercive action. One must remember that
your experience 'after the fact" is limited to patients who,
through your "pushing harder," have either ultimately been
coerced or who have sought another physician. The patients
who are dead don't come back to object or acquiesce to your
paternalism. I am concerned that your post-facto analysis is
based on patients who are still living because they either have
been coerced successfully or they have changed their minds.
DR. PERR0NE: People who really want to commit suicide do
so, whereas those who are more ambivalent often place them-
selves in situations from which they can be rescued.
DR. GRODIN: Obviously you are taking away some decisional
autonomy from patients. I agree that our goal as medical
practitioners is not just to protect the rights of patients. We
don't want to use consent as a shield from patient encounter by
saying, "I'm just here to protect your right of autonomy, so
here's all the data, now you make your decision." I am
concerned not only with protecting patients' rights but also in
ensuring their welfare. The question at hand is, at what point
does the notion of a patient's welfare extend to a justified
paternalistic stance that leads one to declare, "I truly know
what's in your interest better than you do"? This vital clinical
judgment ultimately will define the limits of the physician-
patient encounter. I also would feel uncomfortable accepting
such a radical treatment refusal without probing for the
patient's justification. But I am less concerned with the answer
itself than that some rationale exists. My fear is that you go too
far in probing for answers. If the patient ultimately agrees with
you, you continue treatment; if the patient persists in refusing
therapy, you push further. In this sense it is the answer itself
that determines the end-point.
DR. SIEGLER: Dr. Grodin, what would you have done with
Dr. Lowance's patient? Would you have gone as far as he did?
Less far? Further?
DR. GR0DIN: Actually, I was impressed by the appropriate
level of discourse in this case. I am still concerned, however,
about who was determining the end-point or goals of the clinical
encounter. My notion of the physician-patient relationship is
one in which the patient determines its ends or goals. The
physician and patient then work together in an attempt to
accomplish that mutual task. This is not to suggest that the
physician is the agent of the patient. Rather, I perceive a mutual
respect for the roles and responsibilities of the parties, but the
final decision and ultimate assessment of the "good outcome"
resides with the patient. If a physician cannot tolerate a
patient's final decision, the patient must never be abandoned,
but rather transferred to the care of another physician.
It seems to me that a reasonable dialogue was established
with Dr. Lowance's patient. Obviously I am concerned that the
probing went too far, but I was not there and do not have the
benefit of having had a continuing relationship with the patient.
How far do you go? This is part of the art of medicine. But I
maintain that the answer should be determined by how com-
fortable you feel that the patient really understands what is
going on.
DR. KASSIRER: The problem of patient autonomy and inde-
pendence in decision-making must be even more complex in
adolescents. Suppose a 15-year-old patient similarly requests
that dialysis be discontinued. How much more complicated is
the analysis and assessment of an adolescent compared with an
adult? An 18-year-old is considered competent for the purposes
of treatment refusal until proven incompetent, yet a 17-year-old
is considered incompetent for the purposes of treatment refusal
until proven competent, How would a pediatric nephrologist
handle an adolescent who refuses dialysis?
DR. JOHN T. HERRIN (Chief, Pediatric Nephrology, Massa-
chusetts General Hospital, Boston): In caring for children and
adolescents, the spectrum of decision-making differs in that the
patient has a legal and ethical surrogate, namely, parents or
guardians, natural or court-appointed. Further, variations in
maturity provide a range in the appreciation of the concept of
"present pain for future gain." For these reasons, we must
include patient, caregiver, and surrrogate in treatment plans.
Adolescents' exaggerated involvement with personal freedom
and body image, together with their tendency to engage in
reckless testing and inconsistent behavior, make intrusive or
restrictive therapy (diet, exercise, dialysis) especially challeng-
ing and frustrating [26—28]. As adolescent patients mature, they
should be integrated into decision-making regarding therapy,
providing that full explanations are given and that options are
offered where possible to return some degree of control to the
teenager.
Adolescents need to balance the gains from dialysis with the
potential embarrassment, pain, and change in body image. They
also need to review the cosmetic changes from potential drug
therapy in the event of future transplantation. Changes in
appearance from steroid therapy and cyclosporine frequently
cause difficulties in compliance after transplantation [29, 30].
The anger, negativism, testing, depression, or self-destructive
behavior of adolescence are most often manifest as refusals to
accept medications or fluid or dietary restrictions, or to coop-
erate during dialysis treatments [28, 29]. Attempts by family
and caretakers to integrate limits for adequate treatment with
support and understanding are necessary. Under most circum-
stances, the younger child's or adolescent's family decides to
initiate or continue therapy, and this "adult" decision imposes
treatment on the child or adolescent. I find it helpful to begin
education for the child and family early in the disease process to
allow the child to develop an understanding of the course of the
disease and to have a voice in the family's decision for
treatment. Such early education and integration of the child into
therapeutic regimens, such as giving the patient the responsi-
bility for taking medication, obviate the tendency toward con-
trary views and "testing" behavior of the adolescent.
DR. SIEGLER: In deciding to withdraw from dialysis, do
adolescents follow the behavior pattern described by Kjell-
strand?
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DR. HERRIN: It is hard for a child to withdraw from dialysis
by "walking away" and not returning for treatment. Parents or
guardians tend to coerce the child to come back. I have one
adolescent patient, a ward of the state, who refused dialysis for
6 days while attempts were made to find her. On the advice of
the hospital's legal counsel, we appealed to the mass media and,
with community help, she was located and returned to the
custodial institution and to dialysis. Her expression of anger
and frustration was an adolescent reaction and followed fre-
quent mood swings and episodes of manipulative behavior.
Like Dr. Lowance's patient, she had made a statement so that
her needs and frustrations would be recognized. With increased
support, she continued dialysis until she received a renal
transplant. A similar pattern of fluctuating response was shown
by a 16-year-old male high school student who asked to be
taken off the transplant list on five separate occasions. All
episodes were at times of dialysis-access difficulty. In this case,
negativism, anger, and frustration followed painful invasive
therapy, which changed his "baseline" desire for further ther-
apy. During adolescence, problems of motivation and diffi-
culties relating to therapy are heightened. I was willing to
acquiesce to his desires and allow him some measure of control,
and then to work with the family to restore his confidence in
himself and his treatment. With younger children, such reason-
ing is not possible; for humane reasons we physicians must
show these patients consistency and try to foster a caring and
supportive atmosphere during therapy for parents and caregiv-
ers.
DR. PAUL KURTIN (Chief, Division of Pediatric Nephrology,
New England Medical Center): Dialysis capabilities are not
unlimited, and it is sometimes said that some patients are never
offered dialysis. I think this is particularly true in the population
of patients with acquired immune deficiency syndrome. What is
your opinion on the legalities and ethical issues of a physician
not offering a patient dialysis?
DR. SIEGLER: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for a variety of
medical technologies change over time. Are you asking whether
it is ever permissible to withhold dialysis from patients with full-
blown, stage-IV, symptomatic AIDS?
DR. KURTIN: Yes.
DR. SIEGLER: You could always base the withholding of a
lifesaving intervention on the notion that such interventions are
futile. If one is dealing with a disease that is going to result in
death in a week, two weeks, or a month, that might be grounds
for withholding expensive and invasive technologies. If, how-
ever, one is dealing with diseases of a more uncertain prognosis
in which the withholding of the therapy inevitably will result in
the death of the patient in a short time, and if the therapy is
being withheld for discriminatory reasons, I think one would
want to speak out strongly against such behavior. My feeling is
that life-prolonging interventions should not be denied for
non-terminally ill people on grounds other than real futility or
the wishes of the patient not to receive therapy.
DR. SINGER: I think it is worthwhile to ask: What is the goal
of a discussion like the one in which we are engaged today?
Why should we make explicit an ethical notion like decision-
making capacity or treatment refusal? We can draw a useful
analogy to decision analysis here. Decision analysis does not
claim that the clinical decision-making it describes did not occur
before the decision-analysis model was designed. It merely
claims that there is some value in making explicit the decision-
making process. The thrust of our commentary has been the
same contention for the realm of clinical ethics. There is no
question that these decisions, like the decision under discussion
today to stop dialysis, are made every day in clinical practice.
However, they are made implicitly. We are suggesting that
there is value in making explicit the clinical-ethical decision-
making process. As we mentioned in our commentary, it is
easier to talk in the language of "rights" than to prevent their
abridgment in clinical practice. To improve patient care, we
must examine our "ethical standard of practice." Our explicit
consideration of clinical-ethical decision-making approaches
not only the goal of clinical medical ethics, but also the goal of
medicine itself. To be clear, the goal of clinical medical ethics is
to improve the quality of patient care and the quality of the
patient-physician interaction. As we attempt to explicate com-
plex notions like decision-making capacity or treatment refusal,
we come one small step closer to this goal.
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